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THE NEW JERSEY ESTOPPEL STATUTE IN
SUBDIVISION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Subdivision control statutes allow a municipality to supervise the
subdivision of land in the public interest. As part of the subdivision
approval process, state enabling acts authorize municipalities to re-
quire the developer to install paved streets, drainage and sewage facili-
ties, water supplies, and other improvements that are necessary to the
development. While emphasizing the necessity of protecting the pub-
lic by requiring these necessary improvements, courts and legislatures
have neglected to give the developer the assurance of certainty that
these requirements, once imposed, will not later be changed. This
assurance is necessary, as the developer must be able to rely on the
extent of his development costs when estimating his development
expenses.
Quality residential development requires a substantial initial invest-
ment. Such an outlay of capital may be discouraged when the require-
ments imposed by the municipality are subject to change after develop-
ment has started, and necessitate an additional outlay. If the govern-
ing body can change its approval at will to impose new requirements
on the developer, any reliance on municipal approvals will be dis-
couraged. Even a political change can be a sufficient threat of un-
certainty to discourage a developer. This uncertainty cannot but work
to the detriment of the quality of housing in general.,
Some definite assurance against change in the requirements for sub-
divisions should be offered to the developer once the municipality has
approved his plan for development. Since the developer's plan must
meet the municipality's approval, why should he not be able to rely
on this approval for a reasonable period of time and be protected
against subsequent requirements, either added or changed by the
approving body? Although the courts traditionally have been reluc-
tant to protect the developer against changes in governmental require-
ments which are made in the public interest, land development itself
is charged with this same strong public interest. The layout and de-
sign of residential areas is more likely to be of high quality when the
developer is certain of the requirements and costs of subdivision. If
he must absorb the additional costs of new municipal building regula-
1. Krasnowiecki, Legal Aspects of Planned Unit Residential Development, in
URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, Technical Bulletin No. 52, at 56-58 (1965).
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tions, having already begun construction of his original approved plan,
he may have to sacrifice quality materials and solid structure to meet
those requirements. -
In most states, no statutes provide any kind of assurance to the
developer, and in these states the courts are reluctant to protect the
developer unless he has made substantial expenditures on the faith
that local requirements would not change. The developer can hardly
be encouraged by such a basis for protection. Furthermore, since the
issue of whether an expenditure is substantial or insubstantial is
determined on an ad hoc basis in each case, the developer is surely
discouraged from laying out a heavy investment on the mere chance
that the court might find it to be a substantial expenditure, worthy
of relief.2
Although a few states have statutory provisions designed to offer
assurance against changes in the public requirements, this assurance
is inadequate. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the developer is
protected from change only after the subdivision has been finally
platted.3 'To obtain this protection under the Massachusetts statute,
the subdivider must show that by reason of the subdivision he has
changed his position or made expenditures in reliance upon final ap-
proval.4 This statute, therefore, "exposes the developer to all of the
uncertainties that presently exist under a similar test applied by the
courts without benefit of statute."5
The Connecticut statute affords somewhat more protection than
does the Massachusetts act. When a developer's plan is approved, he
does not have to conform to changes in local ordinances "until a
period of three years has elapsed from the date of approval of such
subdivision plan." 6 This assurance, although it continues for three
2. Id., at 57.
3. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-26a(1966); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 41, § 81U (1966).
4. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 41, § 81DD (1966): "The modification, amendment or
recision of the approval of a plan shall not entitle any person to damages, unless
and to the extent that he shall have changed his position or made expenditures
in reliance upon such approval."
5. Krasnowiecki, supra note 1, at 57.
6. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-26a (1966): "Notwithstanding the provisions of any
general or special act or local ordinance, when a change in the subdivision regula-
tions is adopted by the planning commission of any town, city, or borough... no
subdivision plan for residential property which has been approved, prior to the
effective date of such change . . . shall be required to conform to such change
until a period of three years has elapsed from the date of approval of such sub-
division plan."
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years, is too short for the larger project.7 Assurance is admittedly
necessary at this final stage, but protection against change is most
valuable at the preliminary planning stage. At this point, the de-
veloper should be encouraged to design his plat under existing
municipal requirements, and encouraged to make sustantial expendi-
tures on site planning and architectural design on a firm basis.
In order to provide the developer with assurance at the preliminary
planning stage, the New Jersey legislature provided a two-step sub-
division approval procedure in the Municipal Planning Act of 1953.8
The governing body or the planning board, as the case may be,
may tentatively approve a plat showing new streets or roads or
the subdivision of land along a mapped street. This tentative
approval shall confer upon the applicant the following rights for
a three-year period from the date of the tentative approval:
1. That the general terms and conditions upon which the ten-
tative approval was granted will not be changed.
2. That the said applicant may submit on or before the expira-
tion date the whole or part or parts of said plat for final
approval.
Under the New Jersey estoppel statute, a municipality cannot
amend its zoning ordinance to affect a subdivision that has been
granted tentative approval. In Hilton Acres v. Klein,9 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey concluded that the zoning ordinance was a gen-
eral term or condition of tentative approval, statutorily protected for
three years from the date of tentative approval with respect to the
particular development.
However, the effect of the assurance against changes in public re-
quirements afforded by the estoppel statute was vitiated to a large
extent in two other cases. In Levin v. Livingston Tp.o and in Penny-
ton Homes, Inc. v. Planning Board of Stanhope,"' the Supreme Court
of New Jersey read the estoppel statute in connection with a provision2
authorizing the imposition of subdivision improvements at the final
approval stage and concluded that these improvements were not gen-
eral terms and conditions of tentative approval statutorily protected
for three years.
7. Krasnowlecki, supra note I at 57.
8. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 40:55-1.18 (Supp. 1965).
9. 35 N.J. 570, 174 A.2d 465 (1961).
10. 35 N.J. 500, 173 A.2d 391 (1961).
11. 41 N.J. 578, 197 A.2d 870 (1964).
12. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 40:55-1.21 (Supp. 1965): "Before final approval of plats
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In Levin the New Jersey Supreme Court construed the estoppel
statute most favorably to municipalities. They found that an amended
ordinance calling for streets to be paved with bituminous concrete
instead of penetration macadam (the material required when the
developer acquired tentative approval) was an improvement rather
than a general term or condition of tentative approval. They then
held that the municipality was not estopped from requiring the
developer to comply with the amended ordinance in those plats which
had not been granted final approval, although the plats had been
given tentative approval.
In Pennyton Homes the municipality, having granted tentative
approval to one of the developer's subdivisions, amended its ordinance
to increase the paving width to thirty-four feet and to compel the
installation of sidewalks on both sides of the right-of-way. After citing
Levin with approval, the Supreme Court of New Jersey made the same
distinction between the general terms and conditions of tentative ap-
proval in the estoppel statute and improvements imposed at the final
approval stage. They concluded that the "statutory development, the
arrangement of the sections, and the language used all indicat6 suffi-
ciently a legislative decision that the improvements to be required of
the developer-a different category of items, broadly speaking, than
general terms and conditions-were not to be definitely determined as
of the date of tentative approval.""
It can be argued that the reasoning used by the court in support of
its determination of the legislative intent may just as easily have sup-
ported the contrary result.14 However, the distinction between general
terms and conditions, on one hand, and improvements, on the other,
leaves the developer vulnerable to a considerable number of ordinance
the governing body may require, in accordance with the standards adopted by
ordinance, the installation, or the furnishing of a performance guarantee in lieu
thereof, of any or all of the following improvements it may deem necessary or
appropriate: street grading, pavement, gutters, curbs, sidewalks, street lighting,
shade trees, surveyor's monuments, water mains, culverts, storm sewers or other
means of sewage disposal, drainage structures, and such other subdivision improve-
ments as the municipal governing body may find necessary in the public interest."
13. 41 N.J. at 584, 197 A.2d at 873.
14. In Pennyton Homes, the court cited the following in support of its determi-
nation of the legislative intent: "Authority to compel the installation of improve-
ments was introduced into the scheme by the somewhat extensive amendments of
the original act (1930) made by L. 1948, ch. 464, § 5, in substantially the same
form as the present N.J.S.A. 40:55-1.21. Significantly, this was not an amend-
ment of the general conditions section of the law, K.S. 40:55-13, but of R.S.
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changes after he has secured tentative approval. The court recognized
this problem when it added that although its construction might make
advance ascertainment of a developer's complete costs uncertain, the
legislature seems to have intended that he should not be entitled to
complete assurance, for another section of the statute states that he
may not validly sell a lot, or agree to sell a lot, prior to final ap-
proval.15 The court quickly added, however, that the developer could
protect himself by obtaining final approval promptly after tentative
approval and furnishing a performance bond based on the ordinance
requirements at that time.
It is questionable whether the result in Levin and Pennyton Homes
is in accordance with the intent of the legislature, but it is clear that
the result does not give the developer the adequate assurance he needs.
Even in Pennyton Homes the court admitted that its construction does
not allow a developer to ascertain his costs in advance. To distinguish
between "terms and conditions" and "improvements" on an ad hoc
basis, leaves a measure of uncertainty which tends to discourage good
detailed planning. In order to give a developer the assurance he needs
for a cohesive, well-planned residential subdivision, a two-step pro-
cedure, similar to the New Jersey estoppel statute, is needed. In addi-
tion, such a statute should be extended to include all of the improve-
ments which presently can be imposed at the final approval stage.
While this approach would require the municipality to assure itself
that all necessary improvements are made a part of the tentative ap-
proval, no reason is apparent why such a change would limit the pro-
tection of the public interest in proper subdivision. Final approval
would then be conditioned on adequate assurance from the developer
that the required improvements have been installed, or that he has
been bonded to provide them.
40:55-14, which originally dealt with planning board approval as a prerequisite
to the filing of a subdivision plat.
"The two-step procedure permitting tentative and final approval came into
being with the 1953 Planning Act, which repealed the entire former law as
amended. The provision authorizing tentative approval and specifying the rights
conferred thereby, previously quoted, is found in the procedural section, N.J.S.A.
40:44-1.18, which was adapted from R.S. 40:55-12 in the prior act. The first
mention of improvements in the statute does not occur until N.J.S.A. 40:55-1.21
and that section commences with the words: 'Before final approval of plats the
governing body may require . . .' " 41 N.J. at 583, 584, 197 A.2d at 873. Cf
Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey Under the 1953 Planning
Statutes, 15 RuToGas L. REv. 1 (1960) for a comparison with the earlier planning
acts.
15. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 40:55-1.23 (Supp. 1965).
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It is not clear under the New Jersey statute whether final approval
offers any assurance against ordinance changes, and, if it does, to
what extent. The statute provides only that final approval is a nec-
essary condition precedent to recording the plat6 and to sale of the
land;17 it is silent concerning any protection afforded the developer
on final approval. However, two cases have implied a period of pro-
tection following final approval. In Levin the Supreme Court of
New Jersey intimated that final approval is a bar to changes in terms
and conditions or improvement requirements, but added that the ef-
fectiveness of final approval as a bar to such changes is limited to
a reasonable period.' The case of U.S. Home 6- Development Corp.
v. LaMura raised the same question in relation to tentative approval.
This case involved an increase of minimum lot sizes and dimensions
after the developer had been granted final approval. However, the
statutory three-year period following tentative approval had not yet
expired. The municipality argued that if final approval was granted
within three years, the developer lost the protection afforded by
tentative approval. The court agreed with the municipality that the
three year period of immunity should terminate upon receipt of
final approval. But the Superior Court allowed the developer a sec-
ond period of protection. Citing Levin, it held that "at the minimum,
the developer is entitled to a reasonable time after grant of final ap-
proval to execute his development plan before the municipality may
disrupt it.. " by changing the terms and conditions of approval.'"
Subdivision control statutes should balance the interests of the
public and the developer. It is not too much to ask of a municipality
that tentative and final approval provide the developer with a fixed
period of protection against ordinance changes. Thus, tentative ap-
proval would permit the developer to make plans and investment de-
cisions at an early stage, and final approval would enable him to
execute his development plan with assurance that the municipal re-
quirements underlying final approval of his plat would not change.
16. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 40:55-1.14, 40:55-1.17 (Supp. 1965); Lake Intervale
Homes, Inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 433-34, 147 A.2d 28, 34
(1958).
17. N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:55-1.123 (Supp. 1965); Lake Intervale Homes, Inc.
v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 433-34, 147 A.2d 28, 34 (1958).
18. 35 N.J. 500, 519, 173 A.2d 391, 402 (1961). It is interesting that the
court said that final approval protected the developer against changes in "im-
provements" while it denied that protection if the developer only had tentative
approval.
19. 89 N.J. Super. 254, 262, 214 A.2d 538, 542 (App. Div. 1965).
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The municipality's interest in making desirable changes would not
be sacrificed entirely. It would be bound by its own ordinance only
for a definite period of time and only by certain developers who had
been granted tentative or final approval by the municipality itself.
A two-step subdivision approval framework which provides for pro-
tection against ordinance changes for a fixed period at both stages
could best balance the interests of the developer and municipality.
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